

THE GANDO DISPUTE AND THE FUTURE OF NORTHEAST ASIA'S STABILITY

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THE GANDO DISPUTE AND THE FUTURE OF NORTHEAST ASIA'S STABILITY

by

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ABSTRACT

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KEY TERMS: Gando, Manchuria, Dongbei Project, Chosun, Qing, Tomoon River, Bekdusan Junggyebi, Gando Convention, Convention of Peking, North Korea and China Border Treaty, Yunhaeju (Primorsky Krai, the Maritime Province of Siberia), Goguryo, Balhae

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Today's strategic environment on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. One roadblock to peace in Northeast Asia is a territorial dispute over a piece of terrain called Gando, which is located between the Korean peninsula and Chinese Manchuria and was a Korean territory until 1909. China currently controls the territory, but the controversy over control of Gando will reemerge once Korea is reunified.

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The author of this SRP is convinced that Gando should ultimately be handed back to Korea. However, this first requires an intermediate process that will be acceptable to both Korea and China. This paper advocates a peaceful and realistic way that will increase stability in Northeast Asia and promote a prospering commerce hub between Korea, China, and Russia in this rapidly changing global environment with the final decision on control of Gando in the hands of the residents themselves.

THE GANDO DISPUTE AND THE FUTURE OF NORTHEAST ASIA'S STABILITY

Today's strategic environment on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. One roadblock to peace in Northeast Asia is a territorial dispute over a piece of terrain called Gando, which is located between the Korean peninsula and Chinese Manchuria and was a Korean territory until 1909. China currently controls the territory, but the controversy over control of Gando will reemerge once Korea is reunified.

The dispute over Gando is not well known internationally, but has potentially grave strategic implications, which may lead to a crisis in Northeast Asia and even threaten world security. Considering the 21st century conflict trends, disputes may not be motivated only by political ideology, as were major conflicts of the 20th century, but rather by the age-old problems of control of territory, resources, or political, economic, and social power.¹ Therefore, controversy over control of Gando could create a conflict in Northeast Asia between Korea, China, and Russia.

Gando is a territory of about 42,000 square kilometers located in the geo-strategically important area of Northeast Asia where the boundaries of Korea, China, and Russia come together and where Japan has also had economic interests.² Although Gando is historically Korean territory and some 840,000 ethnic Koreans live there, the territory is currently occupied by China.

China's claim to the territory is debatable. The current border between Korea and China runs along the Duman (豆滿, Tumen) and Arok (鴨綠, Yalu) rivers, and was defined in the early 20th century when Korea was dominated by Japanese imperialism. During the period of imperial conflict in Northeast Asia in the late 19th and early 20th

century, the government of Korea claimed Gando based on historical evidence and the existence of two similarly-named rivers, “Duman,” and “Tomoon.” Korea claimed that the northernmost of these rivers defined the true northeast boundary of Korea and that all of Gando was, therefore, Korean territory. When the Japanese took over Korea, they signed a treaty with China, relinquishing control of Gando. After World War II, the North Korean regime chose not to contest Chinese control of Gando. However, when Korea is reunified, Koreans can be expected to renew their claim to the area.

Over the past decade, China has begun disputing long-standing historical traditions, claiming that the ancient Korean kingdoms that extended into Manchuria were actually Chinese entities. These Chinese assertions, known as the “Dongbei Project,” appear to be designed to establish territorial claims in a strategic region. Along with the Gando issue, these other Manchurian territorial matters are a potential source of conflict and instability once Korea is reunified.

The purpose of this paper is to suggest some ways to resolve a potential crisis regarding Gando, and thus contribute to the future stability of Northeast Asia. In order to understand the political issues, this paper will explain the geographical and historical background, and bring to light pertinent strategic issues. It will focus on the historical background of the Gando area and explain the relevant international relations and border treaties among Chosun (朝鮮)³, the last dynasty of Korea; Qing (清)⁴, the last dynasty of China; the imperial Japanese Empire; and Imperial Russia. Next, this paper will explore the strategic issues associated with Gando. Finally, this essay will provide recommendations to resolve the dispute, and contribute to stabilizing Northeast Asian security.

The author of this SRP is convinced that Gando should ultimately be handed back to Korea. However, this first requires an intermediate process that will be acceptable to both Korea and China. This paper will advocate a peaceful and realistic process that will increase stability in Northeast Asia and promote a prospering commerce hub between Korea, China, and Russia in this rapidly changing global environment with the final decision on control of Gando in the hands of the residents themselves.

Where is Gando?

To begin with, it is necessary to define the location of Gando. The competing assertions on the location of Gando have a very complex and ambiguous historical background. In addition, Korea and China have different views on its total area.⁵

Generally speaking, the Chinese claim that Gando is actually an area of Yanbian (延邊) located in the north Chinese province of Jilin (吉林省). They suggest that the term 'Gando' originated in 1903 and no such separate territory with that name ever existed. They claim that during the diplomatic dispute over the border line between China and Korea, a Korean official, Lee Bumyun (이범운), designated the area of Yanbian (延邊), where Koreans lived, as "Gando." In addition, they insist that the Japanese also made this "fake" claim because Japanese imperialists included 'Gando' when they tried to invade Manchuria.⁶ According to the Chinese, the term Gando had emerged abruptly, and even though they accept the existence of Gando, they insist it should be narrowly defined as a small area of Yanbian (延邊).

However, Korea has a very different position about the origin and geographic area of Gando. The name of Gando is generally accepted by Koreans as originating

from the term ‘GamTu (꺄터)’ which linguistically means “Korean’s first country birthplace.”⁷ According to Korean tradition, Dangun (檀君)⁸, the progenitor of the Korean people, established Gochosun (古朝鮮)⁹, the first Korean state, in the Gando area.¹⁰ Also, the Chosun (朝鮮) dynasty history books, *DongKukYeoGiSeungRam* (東國輿地勝覽)¹¹ and *BukYeoYoSun* (北與要選)¹² show that approximately 100km to the north of the Duman River, there was a castle that was constructed by Goryeo (高麗)¹³ General YunKwan (尹瓘). These records provide evidence that Gando was historically Korean territory.¹⁴ Therefore, Koreans believe that the Gando area should include more Manchurian territory than China claims.

The Korean academic opinions on the Gando area are divided into two views. Some historians see Gando as the southern part of Manchuria. As explained above, they assert that the name ‘Gando’ means the birthplace of Korea. The first Korean country, Gochosun (古朝鮮), was located in Manchuria and the current Korean peninsula, with Bekdu Mountain (白頭山, or Changbai Mountain, 張白山) as the center.¹⁵ They provide, as decisive evidence, maps made by French and British



cartographers at the request of Qing (清), the last Chinese dynasty of China, in the 18th century. German and Russian cartographers in the 19th century also produced maps

showing Gando as Korean territory. Recently Korean scholars discovered these maps and opened them to the public.¹⁶

Based on this view, Gando is divided into two different areas, Western Gando and Northern Gando. Western Gando is north of the Arok (鴨綠, Yalu) River and west of the Songhua (松花, Sungari) River. Northern Gando is north of the Duman (豆滿, Tumen) River and borders Russia to the east.¹⁷

The second Korean academic view divides Gando into Northern and Eastern Gando.¹⁸ This is based on a diplomatic and logical analysis conducted by the Korean Paeksan Society (백산학회), which presents a boundary stone, Bekdusan Junggyebi (白頭山定界碑), as evidence.¹⁹ Chosun (朝鮮) and Qing (清) established the Bekdusan Junggyebi (白頭山定界碑) on the top of Bekdu Mountain (白頭山, or Changbai Mountain, 張白山) on May 15, 1712. An inscription on this stone indicates that the “border line is running along the Arok River to the west, and Tomoon (土門) River to the east.”²⁰ Considering the location of the Tomoon River, the Korean Paeksan Society calculated the Northern and Eastern Gando area as a very large area north of the Duman River.

In addition, the Korean Paeksan Society provides an old Vatican map as evidence. When the Vatican made the parish map in Chosun territory in 1920, it depicted Northern and Eastern Gando as Chosun’s territory. In the 17th century, some Russian diplomats and cartographers recorded that Chosun’s territory lay between the Amur River (黑龍江) and the Liaodong (遼東) Peninsula.²¹ Moreover, this shows that even Yunhaeju (沿海州, Primorsky Krai, the Maritime Province of Russia) belonged to Chosun, and was taken by Russia after 1860.²²

Thus, there are different views about the extent of Gando. However, it is clear that Gando is closely related to Korea's original territories. Although the exact area of Gando may be uncertain, these academic views are essential to an understanding of the disputes among the countries around Gando.²³

Why Did the Gando Dispute Emerge?

When the Qing Dynasty emerged in Manchuria, there was no border line between Chosun and Qing. Chinese historian, YangSoJun (陽昭全) and SonOkMe (孫玉梅), describe the reasons in their book *A History of the China and Chosun Border* (中朝邊界史). They said the main reason stemmed from the strategic situation of Northeast Asia. At that time, confrontation between the Yuan Empire (Mongol Empire, 元朝)²⁴ and the Ming (明) Dynasty²⁵ was intensified in China, and the Korean Goryeo (高麗) Dynasty, which was pursuing "the original territory²⁶ recovery policy" (故土回復政策), had been replaced by the Chosun Dynasty. This situation allowed the Manchu People (滿洲族) to establish their Qing dynasty in Manchuria, which developed from the "Later Jin Dynasty" (後金),²⁷ and slowly expanded its power to the Chinese main-land.²⁸

The first time Qing and Chosun discussed China-Korea border issues was in 1627 during peace negotiations following the JungMyoHoRan (丁卯胡亂) War. However, they did not enter into details.²⁹ After the ByongJaHoRan (丙子胡亂) War in 1636, they discussed a somewhat detailed border line. Although they did not determine the exact location, we can estimate that it was approximately 100km north of the Duman and Arok rivers based on an early 17th century map.³⁰ The result of this war changed the relationship between the two countries from goodwill to one of "the ruler and the ruled": The winner, Qing, as the ruler, the loser, Chosun, as the ruled.

The Qing declared the Western Gando area as a prohibited zone, or “Bonggum area” (封禁地帶), which meant that people were not allowed to move into this area.³¹ This may be the reason why the defeated nation of Chosun’s most famous map “Daedongyojido” (大東輿地圖), which was made in 1861 and 1864, did not draw the northern area of Korea north of the Duman (豆滿, Tumen) and Aprok (鴨綠, Yalu) rivers. Now, some Korean researchers are in doubt as to the accuracy of the Daedongyojido (大東輿地圖) map, especially in regard to the Gando issue.³²

In spite of the Qing declaration of the Bonggum area (封禁地帶), the Korean people were still able to live in Gando. The Qing had a generous policy toward the Chosun people,³³ probably because they both originated from the same area, and had common cultural roots.³⁴

Although the Qing had generally failed to enforce the prohibition against migration into the Bonggum area (封禁地帶) after they established it, their attitude toward this area was changed by two historical events. When Russian power expanded toward the Amur River (黑龍江), tensions between Qing and Russia arose, leading to fighting between the two powers. The hostilities were ended in 1689 by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, but caused the Qing to become concerned not only about the Bonggum area, but also their entire imperial territory.³⁵ The Qing’s emperor, Kangxi (康熙帝, 1661-1722), ordered a map to be made that would verify the real border of the Empire. The task was given to a French priest,³⁶ who made the map using modern precise surveying techniques and cartography methods and left memoranda regarding his work.³⁷ This record was quoted by Jean-Baptiste Du Halde, who wrote in his work, *Description de la Chine* as follows, “to the east of Manchu Bonghwang castle (鳳凰城), there is the border line of Chosun. I

draw the border line with a dotted line.”³⁸ There are several notations in the 18th century Chinese and Korean records that indicate the border line was along the Bonghwang castle (鳳凰城) line, north of the Duman (豆滿, Tumen) and Aprök (鴨綠, Yalu) rivers.³⁹

The second event which caused government concern derived from the Emperor Kangxi’s curiosity about the historical origins of his empire after he subjugated the entire China continent and broadened its territory to include Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Turkistan. Based on Qing ancestors’ legends and a historical book *The Great Qing History* (大清皇帝實錄), he concluded that his people originated in the Bekdu Mountain (白頭山, or Changbai Mountain, 張白山) area.⁴⁰ He ordered his lieges to investigate and he visited the mountain himself in 1677 to perform the ancestral rites.⁴¹

The Emperor Kangxi (康熙帝) developed a strong desire to control the Bekdu Mountain area and take over the Gando region.⁴² He ordered a survey of the border line, a procedure to which the weaker Chosun had to submit, and in 1712, he had a boundary stone set up near the mountaintop.⁴³ This was the Bekdusan Junggyebi (白頭山定界碑), which carried the inscription: “According to the emperor’s will, the



investigator Mokgukdung (穆克登)⁴⁴ explored and verified the boundary. The border line is running along the Aprök (鴨綠, Yalu) River to the west, and Tomoon (土門) River to the east. I record in this stone the border line between Qing and Chosun

(穆克登奉旨查邊至此審示 西爲鴨綠東爲土門 故於分水嶺上勒石爲記).⁴⁵

The problem was that the Qing's investigator, Mokgukdung, carved the characters "Tomoon" (土門) River on the Bekdusan Junggyebi (白頭山定界碑) border stone instead of "Duman" (豆滿, Tumen) River.⁴⁶ These two sets of different characters are pronounced similarly, but have very different meanings and refer to two different rivers. In order to include the entire region that Chinese emperor considered to be the birthplace of Qing, he should have carved the name of the "Duman River" on that border stone instead of the "Tomoon River," because the "Tomoon" River is a tributary of the Songhua (松花, Sunggari) River located much further north than the "Duman." (See, fig. 2)

Consequently, this event caused serious disputes between Qing and Chosun later, because each had a different interpretation about the identity of the boundary river. Despite the official surveyor of Qing carving "Tomoon River" on the border stone, they insisted that the boundary river was the Duman River.⁴⁷ In any event, Chosun was deprived of the Western Gando region by this event and the border stone left an obscure boundary, which directly created the territorial dispute.

How Did the Border Dispute Proceed?

After Qing established the Bekdusan Junggyebi (白頭山定界碑), there was no border dispute for around 150 years. However, two things changed. First, the population of Gando changed, with a great increase in the number of ethnic Koreans who began to outnumber those from China.⁴⁸ Second, the great powers began their imperialist expansion in Asia. One result of this was that in 1860, the Convention of Peking was signed, which gave Russia Yunhaeju (沿海州, Primorsky Krai, the Maritime

Province of Siberia). From this event, Chosun illegally lost the Yunhaeju territory.⁴⁹ In 1886, Chosun asked for the return of Yunhaeju, but was rebuffed.⁵⁰

Qing, opening its eyes to Western imperialism, began to make the border issue clear. The first diplomatic dispute stemmed from an abrupt Qing announcement in 1883 that it would banish all Chosun people from Gando. The people, in dismay, appealed to Chosun officials, arguing that the Qing officials confused the Tomoon (土門) and Duman (豆滿, Tumen) rivers and Chosun should inform Qing of the fact.⁵¹

A Chosun official, Eo Yunjung (魚允中), conducted a survey and concluded that Gando was Chosun territory. Second, he recommended that the Bonggum area (封禁地帶) should be released, movement to Gando should be encouraged, and the Qing should be informed that the area south of the Tomoon River (not the Duman) was Chosun territory. Chosun proposed a conference, and Qing accepted.⁵²

The first conference, called the Eulyu Conference (乙酉會談), was held in 1885. In this conference, the Qing representative insisted that the river identified on the memorial stone was in fact the Duman River, thus Chosun should accept the border as the Duman River line. Additionally, the Qing representative said they needed to investigate the exact border following up from the main stream of the Duman River because the river had several confluent branches connected to Bekdusan Junggyebi (白頭山定界碑).⁵³

Chosun could not accept the Qing's position and asserted that Bekdusan Junggyebi was a landmark that indicated the exact border line between two countries. They said the carved words on Bekdusan Junggyebi certified the border divided by the more northern Tomoon River, and it was a clearly different river from the Duman River. Thus, they argued that it was necessary to investigate the border following down from

the Tomoon River. This conference was held from September 9 to November 27 in 1885 in four sessions, but ended without any results.⁵⁴

The key point of dispute was related to the exact location of the Tomoon River. To this day, China insists that the Tomoon River does not exist, and that the border is the Duman River. However, Korea asserts that the Qing and Chosun investigators identified the border line, and they obviously agreed that the boundary was the Tomoon River, as the boundary stone indicated.⁵⁵ Moreover, there is decisive evidence that certifies that the Tomoon River actually exists and that it is a confluent branch of the Songhua(松花, Sunggari) River.⁵⁶

The second diplomatic conference, called the Junghae Conference (丁亥會談), was held from April 7 to May 19 in 1887 in two sessions. The representatives disputed every inch of ground. Qing's representative went so far as to threaten to kill a Chosun representative, Lee Jungha (李重夏), who strongly stood against the Qing position. Lee Jungha said, "You can cut my head, but cannot cut our territory."⁵⁷ This conference also yielded no definite results.⁵⁸

In 1888, Qing's Li Hongzhang (李鴻章) wanted a third conference. However, Chosun did not accept that proposal immediately because it had paid all the money to have the two conferences in 1885 and 1887. Chosun thought that Qing would not share the cost for the future conferences. However, Chosun sent a message that there had been no agreements, and clarified that Chosun could not accept the Qing proposal about the border.⁵⁹ Eventually, the conference was cancelled, and there was no subsequent conference between Qing and Chosun.⁶⁰

After the agreement broke down, several clashes occurred. Qing opened offices to administer Gando, and eventually Gando was divided up into small administrative areas in 1894. In 1900, Qing created the Yanbian(延邊) office to administer the territory that included Gando.⁶¹ In 1902, Qing stationed troops in Gando to occupy the territory.⁶²

When Qing was defeated by Japan in 1895, Chosun declared itself to be the independent Daehan Empire (大韓帝國) and began to administer the Gando area. In 1902, it appointed a special official and certified that Gando was its territory. In 1903, it conducted a land registry, took a census, and organized fortifications to defend against Qing's troops. There were several armed clashes in September and November 1903. A major armed clash occurred on February 15 and 23 in 1904. In addition, several clashes occurred in the Western Gando area.⁶³

The Empire of Japan, which defeated Qing in 1895, defeated Imperial Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. At the same time, Japan deprived Chosun of its sovereignty by forcing Korea to sign the Protectorate Treaty (을사조약) in 1905. When Japan first became involved in the Gando issue, the Japanese insisted that Gando was Chosun territory. However, they focused on only Northern Gando, and eventually Eastern Gando was forgotten. The Japanese established offices, reorganized administrative districts, and maintained a heavy police and military force in the Northern Gando area.⁶⁴

Qing made a strong protest, and insisted that Gando was its territory administered by Qing's Yanbian(延邊) office. Imperial Japan responded to Qing by saying that Gando was Chosun's territory, the Korean people were not under Qing jurisdiction and, therefore, were not subject to Qing taxes or laws.⁶⁵

However, Japan later changed its Gando policy based on a strategic estimate entitled “Eastern Three Provinces and Six Issues” (東三省 六案).⁶⁶ Japan needed railroads and resources in Manchuria and mainland China in order to expand its power on the Asian continent.⁶⁷ Japan therefore signed the Gando Convention (간도협약) with China on September 4, 1909, gaining the right to operate mines and railroads in Manchuria in return for giving up its claim to Gando to Qing.⁶⁸ Moreover, in the early 1930s, Japanese imperialists destroyed the Bekdusan Junggyebi boundary stone.⁶⁹

The Gando issue remained quiet for almost a century. After Japan was defeated and Korea was occupied by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1945, the Soviet occupiers had no reason to contest China’s claim to Gando, and the North Korean regime also refused to raise the Gando issue with its Chinese ally. However, China demanded Bekdu Mountain (白頭山, or Changbai Mountain, 張白山) area from North Korea because China intervened in the 1950-53 Korean War and rescued an almost collapsed North Korea. Eventually, North Korea and China signed a border treaty in 1962, which is called the “North Korea-China Border Treaty” (朝中邊界條約). It can be postulated that this treaty might have been negotiated by China intentionally in order to eliminate any future basis for a dispute pertaining to Gando. The evidence can be seen from events during the Korean War. When the United States said that the Arok (鴨綠, Yalu) River could not be a boundary clearly dividing Korea and China during the first phase of the Korean War, China reacted strongly and entered the Korean War.⁷⁰ Although the treaty was signed secretly, it was disclosed in 1999.⁷¹ Consequently, from this event the Korean people not only lost a chance to regain Gando, but the division into North and South Korea also left unresolved issues pertaining to Korean territory.

However, the issue has come up again during the past decade. In the Republic of Korea, some intellectuals powerfully disagreed with the claim that Gando belonged to China, and some South Korean statesmen began to insist that the 1909 negotiation that resulted in the current Korea-China border was null and void because it was made between China and Japanese imperial authorities who had no legitimate right to give away Korean territory. Also, they asserted that reunified Korea should nullify the “North Korea-China Border Treaty,” and prepare for recovery of Gando based on international law.⁷²

The Gando issue also became relevant in 2002, when China launched what is called the “Dongbei Project (東北工程)” and began to argue that the Goguryo (高句麗)⁷³ and the Balhae (渤海)⁷⁴ empires, ancient Korean nations that covered a large part of modern-day Manchuria which are deeply rooted in the modern Korean identity and legitimacy, were actually a part of Chinese history. The China Social Science Institution (中國社會科學院), explaining the background of the Dongbei Project, stated that “after the Chinese economic reform, international relations in northeast border area changed, and the Chinese northeast territory became very important due to its strategic value.” They claimed that, “Some countries [South and North Korea] are intentionally distorting the Chinese history.”⁷⁵ However, Chyen Juchu (全哲洙), who takes part in the Dongbei Project, has frankly stated the rationale of the Dongbei Project: “some adversaries...try to tear China apart [and] destroy the unity of the Chinese people...This is the reason why China pursues the Dongbei Project.”⁷⁶ This demonstrated that the Chinese Dongbei Project is actually a kind of proactive or defensive project based on a future Korean peninsula situation.⁷⁷ From the perspective of Korea, it is actually a history

falsification project. A Korean researcher, Su Euisik (서의식), sees the Dongbei Project as intended to block the potential influence on this area by a future reunified Korea.⁷⁸

Strategic Issues

First of all, the settlement of the Gando issue is strategically vital to achieve harmony and reconciliation within Northeast Asia because it is closely related to national interests among the nations of Northeast Asia. Fundamentally, the Gando issue was a territorial dispute between China and Korea, but it involves Japan and Russia, too. The Convention of Peking was signed in 1860 between Qing and Russia, but they excluded Chosun. The Protectorate Treaty (을사조약) between Korea and Japan was forcibly imposed on Korea.⁷⁹ All of these agreements are generally admitted to be null and void in terms of international law.⁸⁰ The Gando Convention (간도협약) between Japan and China must likewise be considered invalid.⁸¹ In fact, the Korean people lost their territory not by their own intention, but as a result of Chinese, Japanese, and Russian interests and ambitions.⁸²

Furthermore, despite Japan's defeat in the Second World War, South and North Korea have been divided since 1945 and that division was reinforced by the 1950-53 Korean War. In 1962, the North Korea and China Border Treaty (朝中邊界條約) was signed secretly. It abandoned about half of the Bekdu Mountain area because China wanted it as a cost of war.⁸³ The division of the Bekdu Mountain (白頭山, or Changbai Mountain, 張白山) area means that North Korea actually lost the entire Gando area.⁸⁴ North Korea certified the border line with Russia in 1990, and gave up the Yunhaejju area, too.⁸⁵

When Korea is reunified, the Government of a unified Korea can be expected to review these territorial issues. It is quite clear that Korean reunification will be led by South Korea. South Korea has around two times the population and around 40 times the gross domestic product (GDP) of the North. The South Korea military forces are better trained and equipped.⁸⁶ The U.S.-South Korea alliance has enough power to defeat the North Korean military decisively.⁸⁷ Even though the North has weapons of mass destruction (WMD), South Korea is under the U.S. extended deterrence umbrella,⁸⁸ and South Korea has the scientific and engineering capacity to develop a nuclear capability in a short period if its national security requires it.⁸⁹

After Korean reunification, the treaties signed by North Korea will be strongly contested by the Korean government.⁹⁰ South Korea cannot accept the North Korea and China Border Treaty considering the principle of “succession of treaties,” and “state succession” in international law.⁹¹ Moreover, when South Korea wrote its Constitution, it never recognized North Korea as a legal government, but rather as a puppet regime. In addition, Article 3 of the Korean Constitution shows that the Republic of Korea will consider Gando recovery after reunification.⁹² Most importantly, because of its Korean origin, Gando will not be abandoned by the Korean people. Although the Chinese claim to jurisdiction over Gando cannot currently be realistically challenged, when Korea accomplishes the reunification and enhances its power, the dispute will return. Thus, the potential for an international crisis will definitely be high.

Furthermore, Gando has important geo-political and geo-strategic value to the other countries of Northeast Asia. Based on Halford J. Mackinder’s geopolitical theory, Gando is included in “a great inner crescent.”⁹³ Based on American geopolitical theorist

Nicholas Spykman's view, Gando resides in the critical Eurasian "Rimland." Mackinder believed that control of Eastern Europe is the key to dominate the Eurasian Heartland and its potential resources. As a British patriot, he worried about the possibility of a united continent under a single power that would deny the maritime powers continental access.⁹⁴ In Northeast Asia, Gando will be the key area to secure the Heartland.

Historically, the great powers close to this area tried to control Gando. A Korean expert in Gando affairs explains the reason as follows, "If Russia took Gando, it could defeat Japan. When Japan did, it could suppress Russia. If China exploited it very effectively, it could restrain the expansion of Russia and Japan."⁹⁵ Gando has historically been key terrain whose strategic location has made it the route of military invasion for centuries. When China invaded the current Korean territory, it passed through Gando. Japan attacked both the Chinese army and the Russian army in Chinese territory through this area.⁹⁶ In retrospect, after Korean reunification, a Korean Gando would serve as a buffer zone between the continental powers of Russia, China, and Korea and the sea power of Japan.


When the dispute returns, the great powers close to this area, including Russia, will inevitably be involved in the Gando issue. Russia took Yunhaeju (沿海州, Primorsky Krai, the Maritime Province of Siberia) without spilling a drop of blood.⁹⁷ Now, a very important Russian military base, Vladivostok, and a free trade port, Nakhodka are in Yunhaeju, very close to Gando. Russia has designated these ports as outposts for its expansion toward Asia and the Pacific.⁹⁸ In terms of the Russian language, Vladivostok means "dominate the East."⁹⁹

Russia is concerned about the sovereignty of Yunhaeju.¹⁰⁰ After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, Korean immigrants in Russia asked to establish an autonomous region in Yunhaeju in 1991, but the Russian government rejected this proposal. One of the reasons is the Russian fear of secession by the Korean people in Yunhaeju. If Russia permits a Korean autonomous region in Yunhaeju, Koreans in Russia might demand secession someday, and eventually the future reunified Korea would absorb it into a greater Korea.¹⁰¹

China also has a fear of Gando secession. China's fear of fragmentation will make negotiating a settlement difficult. Since China is composed of many states of minority populations with historic claims to independence, China cannot allow a minor states' independence for fear that this will lead to many additional claims and the dismemberment of China. Most of the population of Gando is ethnic Korean.¹⁰² If Gando becomes independent from China, the Chinese leadership fear a domino effect, with the reversion of Gando to Korea emboldening other minority states, like Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia, to make their own bids for independence, and bring about the eventual collapse of the current Chinese regime.¹⁰³

Broadening the scope to a global view, the strategic issue of Gando has geostrategic implications. If China has a fear that it is being contained by other great powers, China can consider Gando as an area of vital interest. It is necessary to understand the worldwide view to appreciate this position. If Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh stand against China, it will live in fear. In addition, there are five close U.S. allies (South Korea, Japan, Philippines, Thailand and Australia), and a close

partner, Singapore in the Pacific (See, fig. 3). Ninety percent of China's trade and resources are transited by sea.¹⁰⁴



At the present, China is exhibiting some fear. Even though there are few signs of deeper integration with Taiwan, China continues to foster close relationships with Taiwan.¹⁰⁵ It is still keeping close relations with North Korea.¹⁰⁶ China participated in bilateral and multilateral exercises with Singapore and Mongolia in 2009 for the purpose of developing these relations.¹⁰⁷ Also, there is important evidence of Chinese plans to build air, road, and rail links between China and Pakistan, and to use the Pakistani Arabian Sea port of Gwadar, through which thirty percent of the world's daily oil supply passes.¹⁰⁸ U.S. involvement in Afghanistan may also give rise to more Chinese fears.¹⁰⁹

The most important geostrategic value of Gando lies in the worst-case scenario of China being blockaded except through the Korean peninsula area. In 2004, China

discovered an oil field containing an estimated 20.5 billion barrels in Balhae (渤海, Bohai) Bay (See fig. 3). Even if China were to lose freedom of maneuver in the sea, it could retain its industrial capacity for around 30 years without any oil imports from other foreign nations if it retains the Gando area.¹¹⁰ However since it has a common region with North Korea in Balhae Bay, China declared that it will develop the oilfield with North Korea.¹¹¹ Interestingly, China now announced a reduced amount of oil, and insists that the amount of oil is 2 billion barrels, but that may prove to be inaccurate. Of note, China also claims to have discovered oil on land near Balhae (渤海, Bohai) Bay.¹¹²

If China were to lose Gando, its control of Manchuria would be seriously threatened, especially if Mongolia were to absorb the Nei Mongol (Inner Mongolia). This would reduce China's access to the remainder of Manchuria to a narrow 130 mile gap between unified Mongolia and Balhae (渤海, Bohai) Bay (See Figure 3). If China fails to defend the key terrain in that gap effectively, then it could lose all of Manchuria.¹¹³ Thus, China is unlikely to easily give up its claim to Gando. This means that the strategic implications associated with the Gando issue demand a peaceful resolution to insure a prosperous future in Northeast Asia.

Nonetheless, Korea and China can have a good relationship in the future. They have had diplomatic relations since 1992 and have been increasing their bilateral business exchanges. The two countries have increased exports and imports by a factor of 30.¹¹⁴ These phenomena explain the possibility of peaceful resolution of any future dispute between the two nations. Currently, Korean politicians accept the necessity of peaceful relations for the future. For example, a leader of the Korean majority party Na Gyongwun (나경원) said "Korea and China should make strategic relations for the

future.”¹¹⁵ In addition, the Korean minister of foreign affairs and trade, Kim Sunghwan (김성환), said “two countries should share common strategic interests, and exert to resolve future issues for the more peaceful peninsula.”¹¹⁶ Therefore, if China and Korea find the best way to enhance their future relations, a more prosperous future in Northeast Asia will result.

Recommendations

From the Korean perspective, the best way to solve the Gando dispute would be to return Gando to Korea immediately. However, since China currently occupies the region and is unlikely to give up its claim easily, a realistic approach is essential to minimize tension and dispute. For this, the promise that Gando will be returned to Korea in due course should be preceded by a rational negotiation between Korea and China. This negotiation should guarantee the interests of both Korea and China based on the national interests of both nations. To begin with, free travel, a free market, and free trade should be allowed.

Since Gando has fertile soil, abundant labor and natural resources, and well advanced railroads connecting the adjacent nations,¹¹⁷ if China, Russia, and Korea develop this area under a peaceful agreement, it is likely to become a commerce hub between Korea, China, and Russia. Currently, China has a plan to develop a new large scale industrial site and trade area in Gando and may be persuaded to support Gando as a major Free Trade Area in Northeast Asia.¹¹⁸

If Korea and China establish a major Free Trade Area in Gando, China will earn handsome dividends not only economically but also in terms of political stability. This cooperation could enhance the prosperity and stability of the entire Northeast Asia

region. Eventually a peaceful settlement for this area will contribute to making a more peaceful world society, too.

Establishing a stable and productive diplomatic relationship between a reunified Korea and China could also lead to Japan's peaceful participation. Close relationships among China, Japan, and Korea could lead to a more stable world economy. Northeast Asia is the most dynamic economic area in the world. These three countries involve one fourth of world population, one sixth of world GDP, and one sixth of world trade volume.¹¹⁹ Thus, stability in Northeast Asia has critical implications for global stability. Cooperation in Gando would encourage Russia to also participate in future development of the region.¹²⁰

On the other hand, China may have a fear that the promise of returning Gando will bring a crisis in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia. However, peaceful resolution of the Gando issue will give China more beneficial future economic and domestic political stability. Several reasons can be given.

China has very weak points that stem from its lack of critical resources like energy, food, water, and forest. If China, with its 1.3 billion population, were to increase energy consumption per capita to the Korean level, it could be bankrupted.¹²¹ This situation would bring about a dangerous domestic political crisis. Therefore, China should pursue harmonious economic relations with neighboring countries. As long as China accepts the return of Gando, Korea will cooperate with China sincerely, and China can reduce its economic burden.

The promise of returning Gando does not mean the immediate return itself. It will take a good bit of time. As time goes by, it could be a model for future resolution of

China's territorial issues. The lessons learned from the Gando case will be helpful in developing ways to resolve other disputes, and guarantee more domestic political benefit. Finally, close relations between China and Korea will guarantee more reliable security and might eventually include Japan.

The final stage in this process would be a popular vote in the Gando area under a bilateral agreement. The important consideration will be that the people of the Gando region should be afforded the opportunity to choose the time to permanently join Korea when they wish. If the time is determined, both countries will closely collaborate, and assure a peaceful transition.

Conclusion

Gando, which has the meaning of the Korean birthplace, was originally Korean territory. Now, this Korean indigenous territory is controlled by China. Ultimately, Gando should be handed back to Korea because it has the historical identity of the Korean people. The Jewish people longed for their lost homeland and had faith in God that he would return them to the Promised Land. Consequently, they are now living in their territory. The Korean people may have very similar feelings.

Since Gando has very deep roots in Korean history, as well as strategic implications, the future strategic environment embracing Gando in Northeast Asia could be volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. The potential for crisis cannot be ignored. In order to avoid serious conflict, the Northeast Asian countries should cooperate and find a peaceful way to resolve the Gando issue.

Endnotes

¹ Michael Moodie, "Conflict Trends in the 21st Century," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 2nd Quarter (April 2009): 22.

² 노제현 (Noh Gye Hyun), *조선의 영토 (Chosun's Territory)*, (BangSongTongSin University Publication, 1997): 2.

³ A Korean early modern country located in the Korean peninsula from 1392 to 1910.

⁴ This country was established in Manchuria in 1636, and ruled to 1912. It was the last ruling dynasty of China, following the Ming Dynasty, and followed by the Republic of China. *Never Encyclopedia*, <http://100.naver.com/100.nhn?docid=146247> (accessed Dec 22, 2010)

⁵ 박선영 (Park Sunyung), “간도문제의 시대적 변화상, 17~21 세기 (Historical Transition of Gando Issue in 17-20th Century),” in *만주 동아시아 융합의 공간 (Manchuria The Area for Northeast Asia Harmony)*, ed. 한석정 (Han Sukjung) and 노기식 (Noh Gisik) (Somyong Publication, 2008), 301.

⁶ 윤은주 (Yun Eunju), “간도의 명칭과 범위 (Names of Gando and Its Area),” in *간도연구 (A Study of Gando)*, ed. 김명기 (Kim Myonggi) (Bubsu Publication, 1999), 11-12.

⁷ 박동기 (Park Donggi), *통일한국에 있어서 북방영토에 관한 연구 (A Study of Northern Territory after Korea Unification)* (Chosun University Literature Survey, 1999), 13.

⁸ The History of Dangun has been known as a myth of the Korean people, but it was falsified by Japanese imperialists. There is much evidence. Especially, Lee Byungdo (이병도), who was of the Japanese history school during the Japanese colonial era, was in the a main stream of Korean history and falsified the history of Dangun as a myth. However, he confessed before he died that Dangun history was true. 이병도 (Lee Byungdo), “단군은 신화 아닌 우리 국조 (Dangun is not a myth, but our founding father),” *Chosun Newspaper*, October 9, 1986.

⁹ The first ancient Korean country located in Manchuria from 2333 B.C. to 108 B.C. The original name was Chosun. However, Japanese scholars used term Gochosun(古朝鮮) in order to distinguish it from Lee's kingdom, Chosun, a Korean early modern country, which is normally called “Chosun.”

¹⁰ 이일걸 (Lee Yilgul), “간도 영유권과 중국조선족 문제 (Gando Claim and Ethic Korean Living in China),” *국제정치논총 (International Politics Survey)* (December 1995): 198.

¹¹ This is a human science and geography book of Chosun (朝鮮), the last dynasty of Korea. *Never Encyclopedia*, <http://100.naver.com/100.nhn?docid=102313> (accessed Dec 15, 2010).

¹² This history book was written by Kim Nogyu in 1903. This book describes the Gando conflicts between Chosun (朝鮮), the last dynasty of Korea; and Qing (清), the last dynasty of China. *Never Encyclopedia*, <http://100.naver.com/100.nhn?docid=79138> (accessed Dec 15, 2010).

¹³ A Korean medieval country located in the Korean peninsula from 918 to 1392. In 1388, Lee Sung Gae (이성계) ended this country by military coup and established a new dynasty. That was the Chosun Dynasty.

¹⁴ Chosun was the next dynasty after Goryeo. Thus, these descriptions in Chosun historical books indicate that the area north of Duman was Korean territory called Gando. 노계현 (Noh Gye Hyun), “간도 영유권에 관한 우리의 자세 (Our Position Toward Gando Sovereignty),” *외교 (Diplomacy)* (September 1987): 69.

¹⁵ The history of the Chinese ancient country Eastern Han, *History of Later Han*, shows the location of Gochosun(古朝鮮) is Manchuria, including the current Korean peninsula. That book describes “濊及沃沮 句驪 本皆朝鮮之地也.” This means “Gochosun’s land includes current Korean peninsula and Manchuria.” 이일걸 (Lee Yilgul), “동서간도지역의 귀속문제 제고 (A Thought on Eastern and Northern Gando Return Issue),” *한민족공영체 (Korean People Unity)* 2 (March, 1999), 11-12.

¹⁶ “간도는 우리땅이었다 (Gando was our territory),” *Hankyoreh Newspaper*, July 7, 2004.

¹⁷ Yun Eunju’s “Names of Gando and Its Area,” 14-15.

¹⁸ Sometimes, the terms Eastern Gando and Northern Gando are used with opposite meanings.

¹⁹ Paeksan Society, *The Chosun Map Based on Bekdusan Junggyebi*, <http://www.paeksan.com/frame.htm> (accessed December 27, 2010).

²⁰ 곽주용 (Goak Juyong), *통일 이후 북방영토 분쟁에 관한 연구 (A Study of Northern Territory Dispute of Reunified Korea)*, (Hannam University Literature Survey, 2004), 28-30.

²¹ On this issue, a Korean researcher certified this historical background in his survey. See, 박명용 (Park Myonyong), “연해주를 둘러싼 한국과 러시아 영토문제 (An Issue between Korea and Russia Pertaining to Yunhaeju),” *북방사론총 (Northern History Survey)* 4 (May, 2005), 37-86.

²² 윤호우 (Yun Howu), “17 세기 연해주는 조선땅이었다 (In 17th Century, Yunhaeju was Chosun’s Territory),” *Weekly Kyungyang*, April 29, 2005. available at <http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=114&oid=033&aid=0000006252> (accessed December 27, 2010)

²³ Park Donggi’s *A Study of Northern Territory after Korea Unification*, 12-13.

²⁴ The Yuan Empire was founded by the Mongol leader Kublai Khan. It ruled most of present-day China and Mongolia, lasting officially from 1271 to 1368.

²⁵ The Ming Dynasty ruled China from 1368 to 1644, following the collapse of the Yuan Empire.

²⁶ This land means Entire Manchuria where Goguryo (高麗) was established. The country name Goryeo (高麗) took its name from Goguryo (高麗).

²⁷ After the Jin Dynasty was defeated by the Mongols, its people establish the following country in Manchuria and named it the Later Jin. This country became the Qing.

²⁸ 陽昭全-孫玉梅 (Yang Sojun-Son Okme), *中朝邊界史*(*A History of the China and Chosun Border*), (Jangchun: Jilin Culture Publication, 1993), 145.

²⁹ By this treaty, they made a brotherly relationship: the winner Qing as an elder brother, and the loser Chosun as a younger brother. At the negotiation meeting, GangDoHuyMaeng (江都會盟), they mentioned the border issues. Park Donggi's *A Study of Northern Territory after Korea Unification*, 22.

³⁰ Since Qing originated in this area, it considered Gando as sacred. Yun Eunju's "Names of Gando and Its Area," 14. Chosun's Muniment room GyuJangGak has the map indicating the borderline including this area. Based on this evidence, it can be estimated as such. Park Donggi's *A Study of Northern Territory after Korea Unification*, 23.

³¹ Yun Eunju's "Names of Gando and Its Area," 14.

³² 윤호우(Yun Howu), "김정호의 대동여지도가 틀렸다 (Daedongyojido has faults)", *Weekly Kyungyang*, April 1, 2008, <http://newsmaker.khan.co.kr/khnm.html?mode=view&code=116&artid=17190&pt=nv> (accessed December 23, 2010)

³³ 박선영(Park Sunyung), "봉금지대 국경문제와 연관기피 (Bonggum Area Has Little Relation with Border Issue)", *Weekly Kyungyang*, April 23, 2004, <http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=114&oid=033&aid=0000003743>

³⁴ There is important evidence on this historical fact. The authors of the *History of Jin Dynasty* (金史) wrote about its founder as follows, "Jin (金) founder's name is HamBo. When he came from Goryeo(高麗), he was over 60 years old. His brother loved Buddhism. He didn't follow, and remained at Goryeo (金之始祖諱函普初從高麗來, 年已六十餘矣, 兄阿古好佛, 留高麗不肯從)." See, *金史* (*History of Jin Dynasty*), trans. 윤명수 (Myongsu Yun), (Wanan Publication, 2007), 16. Original text is available at <http://jisiks.com/10017970031> (accessed December 23, 2010). In addition, the book *Manchu WonRyuGo* (滿州源流考), a history book of Qing, states, "the founder of Jin (金) came from Silla (新羅)...the country name Jin (金) was originated from Silla (新羅) royal family name Kim (金) (完顏金始祖自新羅來居...金之自新羅來無疑建國之名亦應取此)." All of them used the same word 金, but only the pronunciation was different. Silla (新羅) was the parent country of Goryeo(高麗) and Jin (金) was the parent country of Qing. See, *滿州源流考* (*A Study of Origin of Manchu*), trans. 장진근 (Jang Jingyn) (Powerbook 2008), 89, 99. Evidence that Qing's families and the Korean people have the same origination can also be found in a Korean scholar's record. BukAe (北厓) recorded a historical and strategic view in his book *Gyuwonsahwa* (揆園史話), which was written in 1675. He describes as follows, "I would like to meet Qing's emperor, and tell him that our ancestors are same. Telling him the interests and losses, Chosun and Qing should make an alliance...defeat the Wae (倭, Japan), and bend the original Chinese (Han Chinese, 漢族) arrogance...But Chosun is obsessed by cultural toadyism toward Han Chinese...Chosun will certainly be collapsed." See, 北厓 (BukAe), *揆園史話* (*A History Written in Gyuwon*), trans. 고통영 (Go Dongyong), (HanPuri Publication, 1992), 165. BukAe's strategic view was ignored. Chosun, which always served the Great Han (漢) people (original Chinese) in order to survive under the guard of the Chinese Ming (明) Dynasty, could never accept that kind of strategic view. Chosun implemented a "Pro-Ming (明) Dynasty and Anti-Qing (清) Policy." Chosun followed Ming first, even though Qing arose as a greater power

in Chinese territory. Because Chosun was consumed by toadyism toward Ming and a domestic struggle for power, it ignored the importance of Qing and its ethnic identity with the Qing kingdom. Chosun actually supported the Ming without any actual capacity during the war between Ming and Qing. Eventually, it brought on the ByongJaHoRan (丙子胡亂), the war of Qing invasion. This historical fact shows the benightedness of Chosun. 장학근 (Jang Hakgun), *조선 평화를 짝사랑하다 (Chosun Has a Big Crush on Peace)* (Planet Media, 2008), 232-233. See

³⁵ Lee Yilgul's "Gando Claim and Ethic Korean Living in China," 201.

³⁶ His name was Regis and his Chinese name was Ryojise (雷知思).

³⁷ Yang Sojun-Son Okme's *A History of the China and Chosun Border*, 336-338.

³⁸ Noh Gye Hyun's "Our Position toward Gando Sovereignty," 70.

³⁹ *ibid.*, 70-71.

⁴⁰ 이은진 (Lee Eunjin), "백두산 정제비의 설치경위 (A History of Establishing Bekdusan Junggyebi)," in *A Study of Gando*, 70.

⁴¹ 정덕순 (Jung Duksun), "간도문제의 약사 (Summary of Gando Issue)," in *A Study of Gando*, 49.

⁴² 국회도서관 (Korean Congress Library) ed., *간도영유권 관계발췌문집 (Collection of Works Related to Gando Sovereignty)*, (1975), 309.

⁴³ Noh Gye Hyun's "Our Position Toward Gando Sovereignty," 73; Lee Eunjin's "A History of Establishing Bekdusan Junggyebi," 72-73.

⁴⁴ This man was the Qing's investigator.

⁴⁵ Yang Sojun-Son Okme's *A History of the China and Chosun Border*, 152.

⁴⁶ 최정섭 (Choi Jungsup), *간도문제와 국제관계 (Gando and International Relations)*, (Junbook university dissertation, 1997), 30.

⁴⁷ When the diplomatic conference was held in 1885, Qing insisted that Mokgukdung made a mistake because the Tomoon River was not the Duman River, and flowed toward the Songhua(松花, Sunggari) River. 노계현 (Noh Gye Hyun), "간도영유권에 관한 역사적 연구 (Historical Study of Gando Sovereignty)," *연세경제연구 (Yonsei Economy Survey)* Vol. XI, No. 1, (March 2002), 14. At that time, Chosun knew that the Qing's investigator, Mokgukdung, could have made a mistake and that he thought the Tomoon River was the Duman River. The Chosun government spent days agonizing over whether to inform the Qing's emperor of this fact or not because it had a fear of the powerful Qing. Even some officials insisted that they should report it to the Qing emperor and that the Duman and Apok rivers should be the border line. However, after having formal meetings conducted by the king, they determined not to inform the Chinese emperor of that fact. The Chosun official history shows the conversation during meetings well. See, *영조실록 권 8 (YongJo History Vol. 8)*.

⁴⁸ Noh Gye Hyun's "Historical Study of Gando Sovereignty," 3-6.

⁴⁹ When Russia colonized that area, it absorbed many Chosun people that lived in Yunhaeju. This is the reason why many Korean people now live in Russia. Choi Jungsup's *Gando and International Relations*, 39.

⁵⁰ 김경춘 (Kim Gyongchun), "조선조 후기의 국경선에 대한 일고 (A Study of Borderline in Late Chosun Era)," *백산학보 (Paeksan Society Magazine)* Vol.25, (1984), 32, 461

⁵¹ 양태진 (Yang Taejin), *우리영토 이야기 (A Story of Our Territory)*, (Continent Study Institute Publication, 1995), 115.

⁵² Noh Gye Hyun's "Historical Study of Gando Sovereignty," 13.

⁵³ 김인모 (Kim Inmo), "간도문제의 제기 (Propound Gando Issue)" in *A Study of Gando*, 110-111.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*, 111-112.

⁵⁵ 도석구 (Do Sukgu), "백두산정제비의 역사적 배경과 건립에 따른 반응 (Historical Background of Bekdusan Junggyebi and Reactions)," in *A Study of Gando*, 63.

⁵⁶ Imperial Japanese officials verified the Tomoon River in 1909. See, 정철훈 (Jung Chulhun), "간도는 조선땅 지도발견 (Map which shows Gando was Chosun's Territory discovered)", *Kukmin newspaper*, September 9, 2004. <http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=005&aid=0000176732> (accessed December 27, 2010). Russia also considered the Tomoon River to be the Songhua(松花, Sunggari) River's confluent. See, 강준만 Kang Junman), *한국 근대사 산책 (A Walk Toward Korean Modern History)* 4 (Human and Ideology, 2007), 25. A China and North Korea secret diplomatic document made in 1962 that indicated the Tomoon River is different from the Duman River was discovered in 2005. "간도와 토문강 (Gando and Tomoon River)," *Sege Newspaper*, August 26, 2005.

⁵⁷ Noh Gye Hyun's "Historical Study of Gando Sovereignty," 17.

⁵⁸ Kim Inmo's "Propound Gando Issue," 113.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*

⁶⁰ Noh Gye Hyun's "Historical Study of Gando Sovereignty," 74.

⁶¹ Now, China has Yanbian(延邊) City in province of Jilin.

⁶² Korean Congress Library's *Collection of Works Related to Gando Sovereignty*, 380.

⁶³ Noh Gye Hyun's "Historical Study of Gando Sovereignty," 18-19.

⁶⁴ Korean Congress Library's *Collection of Works Related to Gando Sovereignty*, 135.

⁶⁵ 김정주 (Kim Jungju) ed., *조선통치사료 제 1 권간도문제* (*Historical Data of Chosun Ruling Vol 1. Gando Issue*), (Tokyo Korean History Study, 1970), 97.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, 383.

⁶⁷ Choi Jungsup's *Gando and International Relations*, 83.

⁶⁸ 김대근 (Kim Daegun), “청일간도협약의 체결경위 (History of Qing and Japan's Gando Convention)” in *A Study of Gando*, 120-134.

⁶⁹ Do Sukgu's “Historical Background of Bekdusan Junggyebi and Reactions,” 57.

⁷⁰ Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: the Decision to Enter the Korean War* (Macmillan, 1965), 84-85.

⁷¹ *Korea Never Dictionary*, <http://terms.naver.com/item.nhn?dirId=703&docId=6608> (accessed Feb 22, 2011).

⁷² Many statesmen have introduced “A Resolution of Gando” in the Korean Congress in 2004 and 2009. However, because the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not want tension with China for now, it could not pass. An assistant to a Korean congressman who prefers not to be identified, telephone interview by author, January 5, 2011.

⁷³ A Korean ancient country located in Manchuria from 37 B.C. to 668 A.D.

⁷⁴ This was an ancient Korean country established in Manchuria in 698. After the fall of Goguryo (高句麗), its people founded the country in Manchuria, and it collapsed in 926.

⁷⁵ 윤휘탁 (Yun Huytak), “동북공정이란 무엇인가? (What is Dongbei Project?),” in *만주 동아시아 융합의 공간* (*Manchuria The Area for Northeast Asia Harmony*), ed. 한석정 (Han Sukjung) and 노기식 (Noh Gisik) (Somyong Publication, 2008), 287

⁷⁶ 全哲洙 (Chyen Juchu), “開展東北邊疆問題研究的 幾個問題 (A Study of Beginning of Dongbei Border Problem),” in *中國東北邊疆研究* (*China Northeast Border Survey*), ed. 馬大正 (Ma Daejung) (China Social Science Publication, 2003), 8-9.

⁷⁷ Yun Huytak's “What is Dongbei Project?,” 287-288.

⁷⁸ 서의식 (Su Euisik), “중국의 고구려사 편입시도와 대응 방향 (How to Counter Chinese Attempt to Combine Goguryo),” *새교육* (*New Education*) Vol.600 (October, 2004): 30.

⁷⁹ Recently, the evidence that Japan imperialists falsified the signature on the treaty document was found. That obviously shows that Chosun did not want the Protectorate Treaty. “규장각 통감부의 한국병합 날조 증거 공개 (GyuJangGak Opened Evidence that Japanese Imperial Organization Falsified the Protectorate Treaty)” *Yonhap News*, June 25, 2010

⁸⁰ “청일 간도협약은 법리적으로 무효 (Qing and Japan's Gando Convention Is Null and Void by Law),” *Sege Newspaper*, November 14, 2004.

⁸¹ 김명기 (Kim Myonggi), “청일간도협약의 무효 (Gando Convention Is Null and Void)”in *간도연구*, 139-147.

⁸² Noh Gye Hyun’s “Our Position toward Gando Sovereignty,” 75.

⁸³ China wanted the Bekdu Mountain area because it supported North Korea during the Korean War. It became a diplomatic issue. However, North Korea insisted that this area had a Korean origin. Eventually, they agreed to cut that area in half, with each country receiving half. Choi Jungsup’s *Gando and International Relations*, 107.

⁸⁴ North Korea takes 55% of Bekdu Mountain and China takes 45% of the mountain in terms of the Border Treaty. 황장석 (Hwang Jangsuk), “북의 국경조약 통일후 효력있을까? (Will North Korea Border Treaty Be Effective After Unification?),” *Donga Newspaper*, August 7, 2008, <http://www.donga.com/fbin/output?n=200808070020> (accessed December 30, 2010)

⁸⁵ “북러 1990 년 국경조약 두만강 하상의 중간으로 설정 (North Korea and Russia Put the Border in the Middle of Duman River),” *Donga Newspaper*, August 7, 2008.

⁸⁶ Doug Bandow, “Time to Let the Neighbors Deal with the North Korean Problem,” *Japan Times*, October 17, 2010.

⁸⁷ The U.S. retired General Thomas McInerney and Paul Vallely said with confidence that the R.O.K. and U.S. alliance could defeat North Korea decisively in thirty to sixty days. “North Korea: A Phased Negotiation Strategy,” *ICG Asia Report Number 61* (Washington / Brussels, August 1, 2003), 22.

⁸⁸ The U.S. Defense Secretary pledged that the U.S. would strengthen extended deterrence for South Korea in October 2010. “U.S. Reaffirms Extended Deterrence for S. Korea,” *Defense News*, October 8, 2010.

⁸⁹ 조갑제 (Jo Gabje), “주권행사에 의한 자위적 대응행무장의 논리와 법리 (The Logic and Principle of Laws for Self Defensive Nuclear Armament by Sovereignty),” <http://www.chogabje.com/> (accessed January 13, 2011).

⁹⁰ 심규석 (Sim Gysuk), “통일시 북중국경 승계 유보론 대 불가피론 (Possibility and Impossibility of Succession in North Korea and China Border Treaty After Unification),” *Yonhap News*, August 7, 2008, <http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&sid1=103&old=001&aid=0002329791> (accessed December 30, 2010).

⁹¹ When reunification is accomplished by South Korea, it will be necessary to ignore any treaties that were signed by North Korea in order to regain its old territory. If South Korea accepts the “succession of treaties,” and “state succession,” then it will lose the right to Gando. See, 윤종철 (Yun Jongsul), “간도와 북중 국경선조약의 통일한국에 대한 효력 (Gando and North Korea and China Border Treaty Effectiveness After Unification)” in *A Study of Gando*, 246-259.

⁹² The history of the South Korean Constitution shows the evidence for this. At that time, South Korean statesmen considered the recovery of Korean territory, including Gando. Their conversation indicated their intentions. See, 엄정일 (Eum Jungil), “헌법상 영토조항,

조중국경선조약, 간도문제의 당사자 (The Article in Constitution Related to Territory, North Korea and China Border Treaty, and Nations involved in Gando Issue)" in *A Study of Gando*, 218-23.

⁹³ Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," in *The Geopolitics Reader*, ed., Gearoid O Ruathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge, (London: Routledge, 1998), 30.

⁹⁴ Colin Gray, "Sir Halford Mackinder and Geopolitics," in *The Geopolitics of Super Power* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1988), 9-10.

⁹⁵ 박선영 (Park Sunyung), "동아시아 제압 가능한 전략요새 (Strategic Fortification Dominating Northeast Asia)", *Weekly Kyungyang*, February 2, 2004, <http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=001&oid=033&aid=0000003313> (accessed December 31, 2010).

⁹⁶ See, 온창일 (On Changil), *한민족 전쟁사 (War History of Korean People)* (Jipmundang, 2001)

⁹⁷ Yun Howu's "In 17th Century, Yunhaeju was Chosun's Territory."

⁹⁸ 유명옥 (Yu Yongok), *동북아론 (On Northeast Asia)* (Hakmunsa, 1997), 168.

⁹⁹ 'vladi' means 'conquer,' 'vostok' means 'the East.' *지명의 어원으로 보는 흥미진진 세계사 (Interesting World History About Origin of Area Name)*, <http://blog.naver.com/lsc4444?Redirect=Log&logNo=120018290572>.

¹⁰⁰ The third biggest Korean newspaper, *Donga*, announced the illegal treaty and unveiled the fact that Russia deported Koreans from this area. "연해주의 역사적 진실 (Historical fact about Yunhaeju)," *Donga Newspaper*, June 17, 2004, <http://www.donga.com/fbin/output?f=jis&n=200406170214>.

¹⁰¹ Park Donggi's *A Study of Northern Territory after Korea Unification*, 79-80. In 1996, a Russian newspaper revealed that Russian security officials recommended that the movement of the Korean immigrants in Russia to Yunhaeju should be banned because they worried about the secession of the Korean people in Yunhaeju. "러시아, 한인 연해주 이동 우려 (Russia worries about ethnic Korean movement to Yunhaeju)," *Chosun Newspaper*, July 17, 1996.

¹⁰² They are called Chosun Jok (朝鮮族). Korean the most popular newspaper, Chosun announced on March 11, 2006 that the Chosun people in Yanbian(延邊) is 0.84 million that indicates 39.4% of the entire population, 2.2 million. 장세윤 (Jang Seyun), "중국조선족의 현황 (Data About Ethnic Korean in China)," in *Manchuria The Area for Northeast Asia Harmony*, 364.

¹⁰³ The Chinese "Dongbei Project" or "China's history falsification project" that has been pursued since the end of the 20th century is proving this fear of China. Since a change in the Korean peninsula situation, namely the reunification of Korea, can threaten China strategically, China needed it as a proactive measure. Yun Huytak's "What is Dongbei Project?," 290-291.

¹⁰⁴ David Lai, *China's Maritime Quest* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, Strategic Studies Institute, June, 2009), 2.

¹⁰⁵ They further improved their overall bilateral relationship, continuing a trend begun with the May 2008 inauguration of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou. They improved their relations both in the diplomatic and economic fields. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2010 Report to Congress* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010), 143-147.

¹⁰⁶ The aftermath of recent conflict incidents in Korea shows China's intention to support North Korea. When North Korea attacked a South Korea warship and Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, China even blamed the United States and South Korea first.

¹⁰⁷ *Military and Security Development Involving the People's Republic of China 2010* (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010), 8.

¹⁰⁸ "Pakistan Launches Strategic Port," *BBC News*, March 20, 2007.

¹⁰⁹ Afghanistan can be used for a pipeline between Iran and China. Hussein regime's collapse and the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan looks like an envelopment against Iran. If Afghanistan and Pakistan intercept any transit between Iran and China, it will have adverse consequences for China. "지도로 보는 미국의 패권 구상 (Map Indicating American Hegemonic Design)," <http://druking.com/50005586066> (accessed January 6, 2011).

¹¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹¹ "북중 발해만 유전 공동개발 (North Korea and China Develop the Oilfield Together)," *Chosun Newspaper*, June 6, 2006, <http://www.chosun.com/international/news/200606/200606060460.html> (accessed December 31, 2010).

¹¹² "중국 발해만 유전량 20억톤 추정 (Bohai Bay Might Have 2 Billion Ton of Oil)," *Nocut News*, September 27, 2007, <http://www.nocutnews.co.kr/show.asp?idx=627403> (accessed Dec 15, 2010).

¹¹³ See, "Map Indicating American Hegemonic Design," <http://druking.com/50005586066> (accessed January 6, 2011). Mongolia would not be able to carry on war against China; however, not being able to use the base and avenue of approach through Mongolian territory would be a serious disadvantage to China.

¹¹⁴ "It has been 18 Years since Korea and China Established Diplomatic Ties," *China News*, August 30, 2010, <http://blog.naver.com/chinavill?Redirect=Log&logNo=150092996075> (accessed Dec 15, 2010).

¹¹⁵ "중국에 통일 한국 우려해소방안 제시해야 (We Should Suggest the Way to Resolve Chinese Worry about Reunified Korea Policy)," *Herald Media*, December 12, 2010, <http://bia.heraldm.com/common/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20101202000272> (accessed Dec 15, 2010).

¹¹⁶ "김외교, 한중관계 구동화이로 나아가야 (Kim, MFAT, Said We Should Make Relations of KuDongWhaYi)," *AJU Economy*, December 15, 2010, <http://www.ajnews.co.kr/view.jsp?newsId=2010121500043> (accessed Dec 15, 2010)

¹¹⁷ “간도와 동북공정 (Gando and Dongbei Project) No.13,” *Hankook Newspaper*, April 19, 2004.

¹¹⁸ 신경진 (Sin Gyongjin), “중국 장진 지린 투먼 개발 (China Develops Jangjin, Jilin, and Tumun),” *JoongAng Newspaper*, October 6, 2010.

¹¹⁹ Korea Ministry of Foreign Affair and Trade, “The Outline of Korea, China, and Japan Cooperation.” http://m.mofat.go.kr//mw2/country_314.jsp?groupSeq=1&groupNm=%B5%BF%BA%CF%BE%C6&s_page=1&ss=&sGubun= (accessed January 13, 2011).

¹²⁰ Currently, Russian governor of Yunhaeju said that he hoped Korean investment in that area. This implies the possibility of more cooperation in the future. “연해주에 대규모 한국농업 투자기대 (Expect the large Korean agricultural investment in Yunhaeju),” *JoongAng Newspaper*, November 18, 2010.

¹²¹ 김진현 (Kim Jinhyun), “중국 패권의 시대는 오지 않을 것이다 (China Hegemonic Era Won't Come),” *Chosun Newspaper*, December 28, 2010.

